If you ever visit the Pro Football Hall of Fame, you might notice an open blue binder encased in glass displaying scribbled diagrams and code words for in-game adjustments.
This is the only game plan in the Hall of Fame. Naturally, it's a Bill Belichick brainchild.
The binder is a memento to both Belichick's genius and Super Bowl XXV, one of the most unforgettable in history. That year, Belichick's Giants upset the favorite Bills thanks partly to a unique game plan that baited a record-setting Buffalo offense into running the ball at an atypically high rate. After dropping 51 points in the AFC Championship Game, the Bills scored just 19 in the Super Bowl and lost.
Belichick's idea - prioritizing pass defense at the expense of stopping the run by playing lighter personnel - now defines modern defense. Teams across today's NFL play more defensive backs and more two-high coverage than ever before.
Now, if Jerod Mayo must make do with the mess of a roster Belichick left him, he might as well steal from his old boss's most famous plan. Because on Sunday, the Patriots' insistence on stopping the run arguably cost them control of the game as much as their three turnovers and putrid pass protection.
Like their offense, the Pats defense now ranks bottom 10 by contextualized metrics like EPA and DVOA; in part because of injuries, and the fact they were out-coached for a third straight game.
In the first quarter Sunday, 49ers coach Kyle Shanahan probed the the Patriots for how they would react to certain personnel packages. He deployed groupings with multiple backs, two tight ends and even one with no running backs at all. In most cases, the Patriots preferred to play with big personnel that featured only four defensive backs, a clear commitment to stop San Francisco's run game.
No problem.
Shanahan baited the Patriots into keeping their beefy base personnel on the field for more than 60% of their snaps, and lulled them into a false sense of security by calling runs that gained few yards and felt like landed body blows for the defense. And when the 49ers passed against this slow-footed group, they landed knockout punches.
San Francisco scored on four of its first five drives and averaged more than 16 yards per dropback versus the Patriots' base defense. The Niners picked up their five longest gains of the game against this personnel, including four passes longer than 30 yards and excluding two touchdowns nullified by penalty. Defensive coordinator DeMarcus Covington did them a solid here, even playing base defense on second-and-10 and second-and-15.
Veteran defenders later bemoaned poor edge-setting against the run and poor quarterback contain, both of which were issues. But these explosive plays, and the inability to stop the pass from their most frequent personnel grouping, were the two main reasons they lost.
Of note: Pats safety Kyle Dugger left with an injured ankle in the first half, a crucial loss that affected the defense's ability to play as big as possible through five defensive backs. But would Dugger's return have put a serious dent into a 17-point margin of defeat? Doubtful.
Might better coaching have kept the Patriots close? Yes.
Offensively, the Pats remain a disaster; not merely because of the NFL's worst pass protection, which allowed Jacoby Brissett to get hit or hurried on more than half his dropbacks Sunday. But Brissett may finally be showing signs of cracking, while Alex Van Pelt's passing game is too static and Rhamondre Stevenson fumbled yet again.
Here's what else the film revealed about the Patriots' latest loss:
Brissett was a walking disaster under pressure, fumbling three times, causing two sacks and tossing a pick-six. His total passing yards were significantly inflated by Antonio Gibson's 50-yard catch-and-run against a busted coverage in garbage time. Set that aside, and Brissett's numbers reflect the type of scattershot game he had; one the Patriots cannot survive, unless they pair it with a defensive touchdown or a dominant rushing day.
Of course, coming under fire more than 50% of the time will affect a quarterback. For the first time this season, Brissett seemed to have trouble seeing the middle of the field, where a couple quicker triggers would have led to more completions. He was much more effective against the blitz, when he had no choice but to unload the ball within two seconds.
Only one of his completions traveled more than 10 yards through the air.
Games like this will come and go, but it's fair to wonder whether the unprecedented pressure Brissett is facing (49% of his dropbacks this season) is having a compound affect. Otherwise, his toughness deserves mention here, as he continues to get clobbered in a way that's downright alarming (10 more QB hits) and engendering serious respect among his teammates. He also finally completed his first deep pass of the season, a 21-yard back-shoulder throw to Ja'Lynn Polk in the third quarter.
Personnel breakdown: 58% of snaps in 11 personnel, 35% snaps in 12 personnel, 5% snaps in 21H personnel, 3% in 13 personnel.***
Personnel production: 26% success rate in 11 personnel, 43% success rate in 12 personnel, 0% in 21H personnel, 50% success rate in 13 personnel.
The good news: offensive coordinator Alex Van Pelt emphasized a quick passing plan that gave Brissett the chance to stay clean early in the game.
The bad: Brissett got buried anyway. Van Pelt's pass concepts hardly threatened the 49ers, who repeatedly drove on isolation routes outside and were not stressed by pre-snap movement or route combinations that put them in conflict often enough. Brissett had multiple passes knocked away on short curl routes, and got knocked around himself on half his dropbacks.
Van Pelt opened by helping left tackle Demontrey Jacobs with double-teams against 49ers defensive Nick Bosa that often involved tight end Hunter Henry. Jacobs allowed just a single pressure in the first half. But as the game progressed, the double-teams stopped, Van Pelt relied on Brissett to avoid pressure on his own with a quick release. In the second half, Jacobs surrendered two hurries, one quarterback hit and Bosa's sack.
Downfield, as the old wisdom goes, coaches get receivers open versus zone coverage, and receivers get themselves against versus man-to-man. The Patriots faced zone coverage on 79% of their passing plays and averaged 3.5 yards per dropback; a clear coaching failure.
Compounding matters was the fact the Pats played with three receivers on most of their snaps, and this was by far their least effective personnel group. Their 26% success rate from 11 personnel (three receivers, one running back, one tight end) was the lowest produced by any grouping this season that took at least 10 snaps in one game.
Bottom line: the wideouts can't get open, the play-calling and play design haven't helped, and defenses are still smothering Van Pelt's attempted play-action shots from midfield. By the end, Van Pelt seemed to punt on the idea of a comeback, calling runs on more than 50% of the Patriots' first-down plays in the second half.
Broken tackles: RB Rhamondre Stevenson 7, RB Antonio Gibson 2, RB JaMycal Hasty 1, WR DeMario Douglas 1
Pressure allowed: LT Demontrey Jacobs 5 (sack, 2 QB hits, 2 hurries), RG Layden Robinson 5 (sack, 2 QB hits, 2 hurries), RT Mike Onwenu 3 (QB hit, 2 hurries), QB Jacoby Brissett 2 (2 sacks), LG Sidy Sow 2 (QB hit, hurry), C Nick Leverett (hurry), Team 2 (2 sacks)
Personnel breakdown: 60% base, 18% three-corner nickel package, 12% dime, 9% three-safety nickel****
Blitz efficacy: 50% offensive success rate, 25 yards per play allowed and 1 touchdown
Defensive coordinator DeMarcus Covington stuck with his 3-4 personnel through thick and thin, flexing his defensive linemen and linebackers into different fronts throughout the game. As the 49ers hammered the edges of his defense in the first quarter (more on that later), Covington opted for more five-man and six-man fronts to combat their outside runs; a tactic that largely worked, especially in heavy personnel.
In passing situations, he backed off the blitz in critical situations with a season-low 20% blitz rate. The Pats did get burned on George Kittle's touchdown catch amid triple coverage, but also forced two throwaways with a new pressure they had yet to put on tape.
Covington did not task Christian Gonzalez with shadowing the opposing No. 1 receiver for the first time this season. Instead, he stuck Gonzalez in the boundary (or short side of the field) for most of the day, and leaned into zone coverage, specifically quarters; an atypical scheme for the Patriots. Quarters coverage has many variations, but for the Patriots' purposes it helped guard against the 49ers' deep crossing routes with two deep safeties and the outside corners also often dropping deep while the front seven committed to the run.
Interception: S Jabrill Peppers
Pressure: DL Deatrich Wise 2 (sack, hurry), DL Keion White 2 (QB hit, hurry), LB Jahlani Tavai (hurry), DL Jeremiah Pharms Jr. (hurry), Peppers
Missed tackles: Peppers 2, OLB Joshua Uche, LB Raekwon McMillan, S Jaylinn Hawkins, Jones, Wilson
Slye set a new franchise record and scored almost half of the Patriots' points. That's a great day.
QB Jacoby Brissett
He took six sacks, fumbled three times and threw a pick-six. Enough said.
RB Rhamondre Stevenson
Can't have it. Four fumbles in as many games is a number fit for a high school running back, not one of the best in the world.
Offensive line
Another impossibly high pressure rate allowed, and few rushing lanes for Stevenson and Antonio Gibson to exploit. This is, unequivocally, the worst O-line in the league right now.
*Explosive plays are defined as runs of 12-plus yards and passes of 20-plus yards.
**Success rate is an efficiency metric measuring how often an offense stays on schedule. A play is successful when it gains at least 40% of yards-to-go on first down, 60% of yards-to-go on second down and 100% of yards-to-go on third or fourth down.
***11 personnel = one running back, one tight end; 12 personnel = one running back, two tight ends; 13 personnel = one running back, three tight ends; 21 = two halfbacks, one tight end.